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Future population growth is uncertain and matters for climate
policy: higher growth entails more emissions and means more
people will be vulnerable to climate-related impacts. We show
that how future population is valued importantly determines mit-
igation decisions. Using the Dynamic Integrated Climate-Economy
model, we explore two approaches to valuing population: a dis-
counted version of total utilitarianism (TU), which considers total
wellbeing and is standard in social cost of carbon dioxide (SCC)
models, and of average utilitarianism (AU), which ignores popu-
lation size and sums only each time period’s discounted average
wellbeing. Under both approaches, as population increases the
SCC increases, but optimal peak temperature decreases. The effect
is larger under TU, because it responds to the fact that a larger
population means climate change hurts more people: for exam-
ple, in 2025, assuming the United Nations (UN)-high rather than
UN-low population scenario entails an increase in the SCC of 85%
under TU vs. 5% under AU. The difference in the SCC between the
two population scenarios under TU is comparable to commonly
debated decisions regarding time discounting. Additionally, we
estimate the avoided mitigation costs implied by plausible reduc-
tions in population growth, finding that large near-term savings
($billions annually) occur under TU; savings under AU emerge in
the more distant future. These savings are larger than spending
shortfalls for human development policies that may lower fertil-
ity. Finally, we show that whether lowering population growth
entails overall improvements in wellbeing—rather than merely
cost savings—again depends on the ethical approach to valuing
population.
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The size of the human population, in the near-term and dis-tant future, is a key determinant of climate policy: All else
equal, a larger population entails more emissions and therefore
more mitigation to achieve a given climate target (1–3), and it
also means more future people will be vulnerable to climate-
related impacts. The extensive time lag between the environmen-
tal pressure (emissions) and the impacts (fully realized climate
damages) differentiates the climate problem from other issues
at the human population and environment nexus, as the costs of
mitigation will be borne largely by people now, but most of the
benefits will be experienced by a future stream of people which
is uncertain in size.
Our paper joins a large literature that estimates the social cost
of carbon dioxide (SCC), which is the economic cost, expressed
in present-day dollars, caused by the consequences for climate
change of an additional ton of carbon dioxide emissions (or its
equivalent)∗. Because in economic theory the optimal carbon
price is equal to the SCC (under certain optimality conditions),
we use these terms interchangeably.
Any framework for estimating the SCC and optimal miti-
gation effort has two prerequisites with respect to population:
(i) Emissions pressure: Analyses must explicitly account for a
range of plausible future population growth rates—which have
proved difficult to estimate even over relatively short time peri-
ods (4)—and their corresponding links with greenhouse gas
emissions. (ii) A social objective: There must be a consistent and
transparent approach for valuing the wellbeing of future popula-
tions through time.
The link between population and emissions (point i above)
has been the topic of a large literature (1, 2, 5–11) (SI Appendix,
section 2).
The same is not true for the link between population and the
valuation of wellbeing in the context of climate change (point ii
above) (12). This aspect is of critical importance because how
population is valued by society will determine the SCC and also
establish whether a policy that reduces population for climate
purposes is desirable overall.
Our paper addresses these questions by using Dynamic Inte-
grated Climate-Economy model 2013 (DICE2013), a leading
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climate change policy. The answer depends importantly on
ethical questions about whether our ultimate goal should be
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ference with the climate given a smaller rather than a larger
population. We also show that whether it is ultimately better
to have a smaller population in response to climate change
depends on which of these two goals society chooses.
Author contributions: N.S., M.B.B., and D.S. designed the research; M.B.B. led the
computer modeling; N.S., M.B.B., F.D., M.F., D.S., and F.W. performed research; N.S.,
M.B.B., F.D., M.F., A.S., R.H.S., D.S., and F.W. analyzed data; and N.S., M.B.B., and D.S.
wrote the paper.
The authors declare no conflict of interest.
This article is a PNAS Direct Submission.
This open access article is distributed under Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License 4.0 (CC BY-NC-ND).
See Commentary on page 12103.
1N.S., M.B.B., and D.S. contributed equally to this work.
2To whom correspondence should be addressed. Email: Noah.Scovronick@princeton.edu.
This article contains supporting information online at www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.
1073/pnas.1618308114/-/DCSupplemental.
∗Here we are referring exclusively to the impact of carbon dioxide emissions on the
climate through its action as a greenhouse gas. We do not address other externalities
associated with burning carbon-based fuels, such as those related to air quality, which
are increasingly encompassed in the term “social cost of carbon.”
































cost–benefit climate–economy model, to explore how population
growth affects the SCC, optimal peak temperature, and mitiga-
tion costs under alternative approaches to valuing wellbeing.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In the Introduc-
tion we introduce two population-sensitive approaches for valu-
ing human wellbeing (these approaches are known as “social
objectives”) and explain the treatment of population in cost–
benefit climate–economy models (CEMs). In Main Results: Pop-
ulation Growth and the SCC, we use a range of recent pop-
ulation projections, together with the DICE model, to show
that population growth has a large effect on climate policy and
the SCC. This is true, although quantitatively different, using
either of the two most common approaches for comparing social
wellbeing across populations of different size, known as total
utilitarianism and average utilitarianism (described below). We
then extend our analysis by quantifying what these differences
imply in terms of mitigation expenditures, observing that smaller-
population futures imply lower mitigation costs under either eth-
ical approach, but on different timescales and with different con-
clusions about the overall desirability of different population
pathways.
Population and Wellbeing in CEMs
CEMs are the main tool for estimating the SCC and correspond-
ing optimal mitigation trajectories. It is important to differenti-
ate CEMs from other types of “integrated assessment models.”
Here CEMs refer specifically to cost–benefit models that eval-
uate the impact on wellbeing of climate change and associated
policy decisions and are the basis of estimates of the SCC. They
are distinct from other types of integrated assessment models
in that they quantify the economic damage from increased tem-
peratures, alongside descriptions of the economy and emission
processes (13). Three widely used cost–benefit-type models are
DICE, Climate Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation, and
Distribution (FUND), and Policy Analysis of the Greenhouse
Effect (PAGE) (14).
The key tradeoff in these models is between mitigation and
climate damages, where mitigation expenditures disproportion-
ately subtract from the wellbeing of people now, while damages
disproportionately subtract from the wellbeing of people in the
more distant future. The tradeoff is made in a way that maxi-
mizes the objective of the model, called a “social welfare func-
tion” (SWF). All leading optimization CEMs share a total utili-
tarian (TU) SWF, according to which the (social) objective is to
maximize the sum of (discounted) wellbeing across time (15–18).
Globally aggregated CEMs such as DICE calculate the wellbe-
ing of the average individual for each point in time as the aver-
age consumption transformed into wellbeing by a utility function
which embodies “inequality aversion.” The TU objective is the
sum of the total wellbeing at each time point (average wellbe-
ing multiplied by the population size), with each time point dis-
counted to a present value at a chosen rate of “time preference.”
Although not currently applied in CEMs, other non-TU social
objectives are common in the population literature and could
be used instead (19). As a central example, an average utilitar-
ian (AU) social objective focuses on per capita wellbeing and
ignores population size, unless population size influences aver-
age wellbeing. The average utilitarian concept has had multiple
implementations in the literature. The AU SWF that this paper
uses provides a clear contrast with TU and integrates straight-
forwardly with the discrete-time structure of DICE and other
CEMs: It calculates levels of wellbeing from average consump-
tion in each time period and then maximizes the sum of those
multiplied by the discount factor, but not by the population.
However, other implementations exist: Asheim (20), studying the
value of population in the genuine savings criterion, uses a sim-
ilar AU as we do, while Arrow et al. (21) instead use an imple-
mentation which Dasgupta (19) calls “dynamic average utilitar-
ianism” and which divides the discounted sum of total utility
across time by the discounted sum of total population across
time. TU and AU each have theoretical advantages and disad-
vantages which have been explored in the population ethics liter-
ature (12, 19, 22), alongside other social objectives (23). AU and
TU are formally introduced as SWFs in SI Appendix, section 1.
In leading CEMs, population size is an exogenous variable
calibrated to a population projection at the time of the model
parameterization (15, 18). Although it is clear that updated pop-
ulation projections are one source of variation in results esti-
mated by different model versions (15), systematic testing of
alternative projections has not been standard in major assess-
ments (although see refs. 1 and 24 and more recently ref. 25);
even less research has focused on analyzing the importance
of assumptions about how population is valued by society and
what that means for climate policy. In stark contrast, there has
been comprehensive treatment of the ethical parameters that
determine the discount rate referred to above—the inequality
aversion parameter and the rate of time preference—with the
choice of these parameters becoming one of the most prominent
debates in climate economics (16, 26–29). The lack of attention
to the social valuation of population growth is particularly sur-
prising because population size, unlike the discounting parame-
ters, is modifiable by policy intervention.
Main Results: Population Growth and the Social Cost of
Carbon Dioxide
In this section, we explore the consequences for the mitigation
policy of assuming different potential future populations and
social objectives (TU vs. AU). We take our population pro-
jections from the 2015 revision of the United Nations (UN)-
medium, -low, and -high population scenarios (30) as well as a
more extreme (“Ultralow”) case based on Basten et al. (31) (Fig.
1A). Although we retain the names of the UN projections, we
have modified them by extending them beyond 2100, when they
end (Materials and Methods).
Analyses were conducted using a variant of the 2013 version
of the DICE model (15), with results summarized as differences
in optimal global harmonized carbon prices (Fig. 1B) and future
temperature rise (Fig. 1C) over time. We depart from the official
DICE2013 model only by fixing the savings rate at 25.8%, which
is consistent with other CEMs; this change has little impact on
results, as shown in SI Appendix, Fig. S1 (ref. 32, Materials and
Methods, and SI Appendix, section 2).
Each of these results is an optimal mitigation policy path under
DICE, meaning that mitigation effort maximizes intertemporal
discounted wellbeing, according to the chosen social objective.
Below, we also discuss results for the same population scenar-
ios but constrained by temperature targets. Unless otherwise
noted, all model runs assume a 1.5% annual rate of time pref-
erence and a 1.45 inequality aversion parameter (representing
the diminishing marginal utility of consumption), the values cho-
sen for DICE2013 by William Nordhaus, the architect of the
model. In SI Appendix a wider range of population projections
are tested, based on the shared socioeconomic pathways (SSPs)
and the UN’s probabilistic scenarios (SI Appendix, Fig. S2), as
well as sensitivity to the assumption of a near-zero (0.1%) rate of
time preference (SI Appendix, Fig. S3). SI Appendix also contains
results based on a regionalized version of DICE, demonstrating
that our general findings are unaffected when region-specific dif-
ferences in economic and climate variables, as well as population
estimates, are explicitly represented (SI Appendix, Fig. S4).
Carbon Price. The solid lines in Fig. 1B present results with the
standard TU social objective; dashed lines represent AU. The
results demonstrate that future population has a large effect on
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Fig. 1. Population scenarios and corresponding influences on optimal mitigation and temperature under the TU and AU social objectives. (A) UN-high,
-medium, and -low population scenarios (with extrapolations beyond 2100) and the Ultralow scenario. (B) Optimal prices. (C) Global average tempera-
ture rise.
optimal policy, with carbon prices over 85% higher in 2025 and
120% higher in 2050, assuming the UN-high compared with the
UN-low population scenario given the TU objective. Relatedly,
full abatement (100% decarbonization)—the point in Fig. 1B
where each carbon price path peaks and subsequently declines
along a single line (representing an assumed “backstop price”
at which zero carbon technologies are competitive with all fos-
sil fuels)—occurs more than half a century later under the UN-
low vs. UN-high scenario. Carbon prices in the Ultralow scenario
stay far lower still, and full abatement is never optimal given
the TU objective. A regionally disaggregated comparison of the
UN-medium with the UN-low scenario—as well as an alternative
comparison of an SSP-inspired population scenario—shows that
the differences in the SCC across alternative population projec-
tions are principally driven by differences in the future popula-
tion paths of developing countries, with sub-Saharan Africa the
greatest contributor (SI Appendix, Fig. S5 and Table S1).
The dashed lines in Fig. 1B present results under AU and
compared with the TU results (solid lines) elucidate the distinct
mechanisms by which population influences optimal climate pol-
icy. Note in particular that the AU curves diverge slowly, since
AU does not weight time periods by population size. In contrast,
the TU price paths quickly diverge from each other, even in the
near term, because TU is sensitive to the role of future popula-
tion growth in its weighting of period wellbeing.
In other words, in the near term, the AU price paths are insen-
sitive to the size of the future population because population
assumptions do not influence the social objective; it is the aver-
age level of wellbeing that matters. In the long run, however, the
AU price paths do diverge as the increasing difference in pop-
ulation size begins to cause an increasing disparity in emission
pressure. As a result, AU-optimal price paths become more like
their TU counterparts as more time passes. Further results in SI
Appendix, section 6 separate the effects on the optimized results
of the population weighting effect of future population growth
from the emission effects of future population growth: These two
mechanisms can be isolated by the use of diagnostic model runs
that mix one population path’s role in economic consumption
(emissions) with another population’s role in the social objective.
To help explain the mechanism of this result, consider a hypo-
thetical case of constant exponential population growth. Under
TU, the rate of population growth would be linearly added to
or subtracted from the rate of pure exponential time discounting
to determine the weight put on average wellbeing of future time
periods: The weighting roles of time preference and population
growth are analogous (ref. 3, p. 136 and SI Appendix, section 1).
Because the difference in population growth to 2200 between
the UN-high and -low scenarios is comparable to a 1.4 percent-
age point constant difference in population growth, we show in
SI Appendix, Fig. S6 that the difference in optimal policy under
TU between these population trajectories is similar to changing
the rate of pure time preference from 0.1% to 1.5%. A rate of
time preference ranging from 0.1% to 1.5% bounds the values
for time preference common in the climate economics and pol-
icy literature (16, 26, 28). Therefore, under TU, the importance
of population assumptions for optimal carbon policy is quantita-
tively comparable to the assumptions frequently debated about
time preference. Under AU, the rate of population growth has
no weighting effect.
Optimal Peak Temperature. Strikingly, temperatures increase less
in the higher-population optima (Fig. 1C). This is especially true
under TU, because a given level of climate damages registers as
a greater social cost when more people suffer from it.
Increasing the future population growth rate could theoreti-
cally increase or decrease optimal peak temperature under AU
and under TU. But the theoretically unambiguous prediction—
which our results display—is that population growth will reduce
optimal peak temperature more under TU than AU, because
there is an additional weighting effect of population. Fur-
ther, under both TU and AU, increasing the future population
increases the SCC, which accelerates the date of full mitigation
(100% decarbonization), causing peak temperature rise to be
lower and occur sooner. This effect is stronger under TU, again
because of the population weighting effect. (For more detail on
the result that TU optimal peak temperature falls with increasing
population and comparison with the literature, see SI Appendix,
section 3.)
One policy implication of these results is that whether differ-
ences in the assumed future population trajectory influence near-
term mitigation policy depends upon the choice of the social
objective: Under TU, near-term optimal climate policy is sen-
sitive to future population growth, but under AU it is much less
so. This finding has a direct bearing on potential mitigation cost
savings from putting the world on a lower-population trajectory,
which we consider in the next section.
Mitigation Cost Savings from Smaller Population Under TU
and AU
An important prior literature has explored whether human devel-
opment policies that reduce population size could lead to large
benefits through avoided climate mitigation costs (1, 2, 5, 7, 9–11).
































Accordingly, in this section we explore potential cost savings,
in quantitative terms, of achieving the UN-low vs. UN-medium
scenario. These two population scenarios were chosen because
our goal is to compare mitigation costs under the central popula-
tion projection against the costs under a lower-population alter-
native that may be roughly achievable given additional invest-
ments in human development.
To compute mitigation cost savings, we depart from the pre-
vious section, which presented optimal mitigation trajectories
without any constraint on the level of temperature increase, by
here estimating the mitigation costs (and savings) needed to
achieve targets of 2 ◦C and 3 ◦C under both population scenar-
ios. This allows us to compare costs when the level of temper-
ature rise is held constant, including at the 2 ◦C target that is
often considered necessary to prevent dangerous climate change.
(Note that a target of 2 ◦C and 3 ◦C requires greater than optimal
mitigation effort in DICE—see Fig. 1C for optimal peak temper-
atures.) Further results in SI Appendix, Table S4 investigate the
effect of population growth on mitigation costs when mitigation
effort is suboptimally low (i.e., results in higher peak tempera-
tures).
With the standard TU social objective, smaller population
entails lower near-term carbon prices and therefore results in
near-term mitigation cost savings (Fig. 2 and SI Appendix, Tables
S2 and S3). Regional disaggregation for the 2 ◦C target shows
that it is the wealthier regions—those most able to finance sus-
tainable development—that would save the most, in per capita
terms (SI Appendix, Fig. S7). With AU, cost savings occur only in
the more distant future. Results with additional population sce-
narios, robustness checks, and an explanation of the cost savings
calculation are available in SI Appendix, section 2 and Tables S2
and S3).
One debate within the climate literature is whether interven-
tions that reduce population growth rates would be effective cli-
mate policy, because a smaller future population will have lower
emissions, all else equal. Our results have an implication for that
debate: Under TU, a smaller future population implies near-
term mitigation cost savings in the tens of billions of dollars
annually. As a result, we show in Fig. 2 and associated results
and discussion in SI Appendix, section 4 and Tables S2 and S3
Fig. 2. Mitigation cost savings from moving from the UN-medium to the UN-low population path, under TU and AU social objectives, given 2 ◦C and 3 ◦C
temperature targets. Cost savings stop when full abatement is reached in both population scenarios.
that some feasible, noncoercive policies (e.g., education and
family planning programs) to promote human development in
the developing world—and thereby reduce fertility—can result
in avoided near-term climate mitigation costs more than large
enough to pay for the programs.
In contrast, because population growth has a smaller effect on
the near-term SCC under AU, policy to reduce future popula-
tion growth entails almost no near-term mitigation cost savings.
In fact, in the 2 ◦C case, the “savings” are slightly negative in
the first few periods: Although the theoretical prediction is clear
that reducing population growth would reduce overall mitigation
costs over the full future time horizon studied, there is no nec-
essary theoretical prediction about this numerical result in these
few periods where mitigation costs are very low under either pop-
ulation path. Reduced population growth would eventually offer
mitigation cost savings under both TU and AU as reduced pop-
ulation eventually causes reduced emissions pressure (Fig. 2).
This result suggests a possible rethinking of the reason why
reducing future population growth would reduce climate mitiga-
tion costs. The standard argument is that a reduced population
would influence mitigation policy because a smaller population
would have less emissions pressure. However, our AU and TU
results have identical populations and associated emissions pres-
sure. The large near-term difference in mitigation cost savings
with TU compared with AU therefore suggests another reason:
For any given level of climate change, increasing the future pop-
ulation increases the social valuation of climate damages under
TU but not under AU.
Does Reducing Population Improve Overall Wellbeing?
We have seen that mitigation cost savings arise, albeit on dif-
ferent timescales, under both TU and AU. Does this imply that
both TU and AU recommend policies to reduce population size?
Not necessarily, because mitigation cost savings are only one way
population size influences wellbeing. Because AU and TU value
population differently, the full valuation of a population path is
a further question.
Table 1 shows that the answer again depends on whether
AU or TU is chosen: In the context of our CEM, the sign of
recommended population policy depends on the treatment of
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Table 1. Social valuation of population paths by AU and TU, at
optimal climate policies, as a percentage of valuation of the UN-
medium path
Social objective UN-high, % UN-medium, % UN-low, %
AU 99.5 100 100.6
TU 192.3 100 40.4
population in the social objective. AU regards moving from UN-
medium to UN-low population as a slight improvement, because
average wellbeing is increased and there is no loss in wellbe-
ing from foregone people. In contrast, TU regards moving to a
smaller population as much worse.
This reveals a tension in the climate literature not previously
recognized: For a standard CEM to reconstruct and endorse a
common policy recommendation in the literature—that popula-
tion growth should be reduced as a form of climate mitigation—
requires an AU-like social objective. However, all CEMs with a
social objective assume TU. A TU social objective could recom-
mend policies that encourage lower population growth, but only
if, beyond the emissions reductions and climate mitigation ben-
efits entailed in DICE, other benefits of reduced population for
average wellbeing are large enough to outweigh the reduction in
population size.
Discussion
Climate change mitigation incurs a cost in the near term but
will primarily benefit people in the future, including an unknown
number of those not yet born. As a result, the number of future
people is an important determinant of climate policy, depend-
ing on how society chooses to value the quantity and quality of
people’s lives. As O’Neill and Wexler have discussed in regard
to the climate externalities of having children, “in general, com-
paring welfare across different population sizes introduces pro-
found theoretical issues” (ref. 10, p. 344), with advantages and
disadvantages of each approach.
Our results have used the DICE modeling framework to
show that alternative approaches to valuing wellbeing—common
outside of the climate literature—and alternative projections
of future population have large and often immediate impacts
on recommended climate mitigation policy. Moreover, these
assumptions interact, with the impact of different population
projections dependent on the role of population in the social val-
uation of wellbeing.
Our modeling approach has extended previous analyses in sev-
eral respects. DICE allows for a systematic integration of eco-
nomic and climatic variables alongside alternative approaches to
social wellbeing and enables an investigation of population size
to be placed within the SCC framework. Further investigation
could consider substituting AU for the TU objective function in
other CEMs.
Because the goal of our analysis is to highlight the importance
to the SCC of the role of population in the social objective, there
are limitations to our approach. These are discussed more fully
in SI Appendix, but we highlight three here.
First, DICE considers only the size of the population, but not
variables related to its composition. Instead, DICE subsumes
these into a reduced-form model of the economy that trans-
lates population size, capital stock, and technology into pro-
duction and emissions. We abstract away from population com-
position because our paper focuses principally on the valua-
tion of population rather than the emissions pressure of pop-
ulation. However, urbanization and age structure in particu-
lar have been shown to influence greenhouse gas emissions,
although studies suggest that the two may largely offset globally
(2, 6, 7).
Second, although we study exogenous population paths, pre-
vious work indicates that the links between fertility and cli-
mate impacts are not uniform across regions (2). Our robustness
checks in SI Appendix, using a regionalized version of DICE, sug-
gest that our results are robust to disaggregation.
Third, some policies affecting population growth may also
affect resilience to adverse impacts of climate change (33, 34).
Although such effects may be important for climate policy, they
are beyond the scope of our study, which focuses on the impor-
tance of population projections and values within the context of
a standard CEM. More broadly, our model has not considered
endogenous effects of climate change or climate policy on fer-
tility or any important nonclimate benefits of policy that offers
opportunities to reduce fertility.
The choice of an AU vs. TU social objective has meaning-
ful consequences for climate mitigation policy. This choice influ-
ences the SCC and can also determine both the magnitude and
sign of the appropriate population policy response to climate
change: Where TU would value the additional lives of a larger
population over the resulting climate damages and mitigation
expenditures, AU would recommend a smaller population to
avoid these costs. This choice is therefore important for climate
policy, although it is not yet widely discussed within the climate
change community.
Materials and Methods
We use the Excel version of the DICE2013 CEM as downloaded from
William Nordhaus’s website, which is freely available online (currently
at aida.econ.yale.edu/∼nordhaus/homepage/documents/) and has been
described in detail elsewhere (15, 35). Further details of the DICE model and
its assumptions are presented in SI Appendix, section 2. In Dataset S1 we
also present all data and the interactive, optimizable model in spreadsheet
form for every result.
Briefly, DICE is a global (single-region) optimization model that includes
an economic and a geophysical component that are linked. Economic
activity produces emissions, which are a function of gross domestic prod-
uct (output) and a time-varying ratio of emissions to output, as well as
emission control policies; carbon intensity is exogenous. Population influ-
ences emissions by influencing output via a Cobb–Douglas production
function. If unmitigated, emissions affect the future economy through
climate-related damages (24, 36), which increase with the global sur-
face temperature and are incurred as the loss of a percentage of out-
put. Emission reductions (mitigation) occur through a globally uniform
carbon price.
Like all leading CEMs, the size of the population is an exogenous vari-
able in DICE. In this study, we compute optimal carbon prices and thus
mitigation paths by exogenously specifying a variety of population tra-
jectories, based primarily on the 2015 revision of the UN’s World Popula-
tion Prospects and the Shared Socioeconomic Pathway project (30, 37, 38).
Both of these sources provide a range of population estimates through
2100. To project beyond 2100 we assume that the population growth rate
in the timestep ending in 2100 tapers linearly to zero between 2100 and
2195 and remains constant thereafter. The Ultralow projection continues
past 2100.
Other than the changes to population that are essential to our experi-
ments, the DICE2013 model is unchanged (including default parameter val-
ues, such as a climate sensitivity of 3.2) with one exception: We specify an
exogenous savings rate of 25.8%, which can be interpreted as the optimal
savings rate of private savers with a time-separable and discounted objec-
tive with a logarithmic utility function (32, 39). To explain this approach,
we first note that there are two alternative treatments of savings in the
climate–economy modeling literature: One approach assumes that eco-
nomic agents endogenously look forward to climate damages and poli-
cies and optimally adjust their planned savings (a leading example is in
the official versions of DICE/Regional Integrated Climate Economy (RICE)),
and another assumes that savings do not so respond to climate policy opti-
mization (leading examples are FUND and PAGE; in a DICE/RICE frame-
work, see ref. 32). Although both approaches are defensible, we pre-
fer and use the second approach, because we find it more realistic to
assume that society has a fixed appetite for savings that is essentially
insensitive to climate change and climate policy decisions. In SI Appendix,
Fig. S1, we demonstrate that our results are substantively identical and
































quantitatively very similar if we instead endogenize optimal savings as
in DICE.
In a small subset of our modeling runs, we also make an additional
change to DICE to investigate our research questions. To generate one result
reported in the main text, we change the rate of time preference to the
value that would make the optimal mitigation trajectory of the UN-low
population scenario provide the closest fit to that of the UN-high scenario
(SI Appendix, section 2 and Fig. S6). To generate results for the runs maxi-
mizing AU, we altered the social objective accordingly (SI Appendix, Eq. S2).
For Fig. 2, we maximize the social objective (AU or TU) subject to the con-
straint that temperature must never rise above the target in the 2 ◦C and
3 ◦C cases.
Please see SI Appendix, sections 1 and 2 for additional specifics of Materi-
als and Methods, which includes details on TU and AU, information on how
cost savings were calculated, and a description of the regionalized model-
ing that underlies the results presented in SI Appendix, Fig. S7 and Table S1
(40–47).
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